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Abstract: This article provides insights on how to manage collective innovation in the digital economy, 
an innovation regime which is riddled with complex regulatory challenges and increasing litigation 
over intellectual property rights. Private collective organisations face two main challenges: (1) to 
promote collective innovation while preserving the private interests of the firms within the collective, 
and (2) to ensure that collective innovation does not weaken healthy competition. Through a case 
study of the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), an exemplary private collective federation of 
organisations composed of standardization bodies, industry consortia and technology producers, we 
identify organisational solutions to these challenges. We find that a combination of specific IP rights 
instruments is key to manage these trade-offs. We also find that the combined policies of essential 
patenting, FRAND, and maximum royalty rate help overcome the specific challenges associated with 
collective innovation within competitive contexts. Finally we discuss the implications of our findings 
for managers and for policy. 
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Innovation Policy within Private Collectives: Evidence on 3GPP’s Regulation Mechanisms to 
Facilitate Collective Innovation  
 
1. Introduction 
Innovation policy, aiming to enhance economic welfare benefits derived from innovation, has 
traditionally used three types of instruments: intellectual property rights (IPR), competition policy 
and budgetary incentives through taxes and subsidies. The logics behind these approaches are 
complementary: IPR is meant to protect innovators’ financial incentives to innovate, whereas 
competition policy protects competition on the assumption that, once unleashed, competitive 
market forces constitute an effective mechanism to spur innovation.  At the same time, 
governments regularly deploy taxes and subsidies to encourage innovative firms. Taken together, 
these instruments ensure that innovators, be they individuals or firms, can profit from 
commercializing their innovations (Teece 1986; Teece 2006), which feeds back into encouraging 
them to further innovate. 
While these policy instruments have been developed in an economy largely reliant on 
manufacturing, today’s economy raises different kinds of challenges with regards to innovation. In 
particular, innovations within the digital economy are parts of complex and interdependent 
technological systems, and mostly conducted in a distributed, collaborative manner (Yoo 2012). 
Digital industries are typically structured around platform-based ecosystems where firms collaborate 
and compete around modular components and interfaces (Gawer & Cusumano 2002; Sanchez 1995). 
As a result, the management of IPR under collaborative innovation regimes becomes far more 
nuanced than in traditional contexts (Shapiro 2001). 
Collective innovation, which is pervasive in the digital economy, creates complex regulatory 
challenges (Gawer 2012), as well as increasing litigation over intellectual property rights involving 
firms (Economist 2012; FT 2012; Forbes 2013a) as well as governments (FT 2013). In response to 
these phenomena, recent literature calls for new innovation policies that (1) better integrate private 
interests with public policy (Howells 2006; Shapiro 2008; Morlacchi & Martin 2009; Flanagan et al. 
2011) and (2) provide new instruments to regulatory bodies and firms facilitating collaborative 
innovation (de Jong et al. 2010; Ebersberger 2011; Levy & Reid 2011). 
This paper aims to make progress on these issues, by focusing on a unique case study in the telecom 
sector. The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) is a federation of organizations comprising 
of standardization bodies from Asia, Europe and North America, industry consortia, technology 
producers including large firms such as Ericsson, Huawei, Motorola, Nokia, Qualcomm, and small 
firms, as well as large technology consumers such as telecommunication operators. 
Since its creation in 1997, 3GPP has aimed to stimulate collective innovation while promoting the 
private interests of a number of partners who may be competitors as well as collaborators. It has 
therefore faced for a number of years some of the complex challenges that the public regulator is 
starting to face when aiming to promote innovation in the digital economy. 3GPP has been largely 
successful in its efforts, with 90% of the 6 billion mobile subscribers using 3GPP-sponsored 
technologies (GSA 2013). Through a multi-method study combining interviews and a survey, we 
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explore in this paper the regulation mechanisms through which 3GPP manages the trade-offs of: (1) 
aligning the private interests of the firms within the collective; (2) ensure that collective innovation 
does not weaken healthy competition.  
We find that a combination of specific IP rights instruments is key to managing these trade-offs. 
Specifically, we find that the combined policies of essential patenting, FRAND, and maximum royalty 
rate help overcome the specific challenges associated with collective innovation within competitive 
contexts. 
The paper contributes therefore to the literatures on private collective innovation and IP rights and 
helps bridge these literatures. Our contributions are the following. We contribute to the private 
collective literature as our paper is the first to our knowledge that explores empirically how the 
management of IP rights affects the ability of a private collective organization to both innovate and 
compete. We find that the manner in which IP rights instruments are implemented in practice has a 
profound impact on shaping the process and the outcome of collective innovation in private 
collective organizations. 
Relevant to the IP rights literature, we extend this literature by assessing a study of the combination 
and the interaction of different IP rights mechanisms operate in the context of a private collective 
organization. Specifically, and contrary to results questioning the validity of FRAND (Treacy & 
Lawrance 2008), we find that this instrument is beneficial both at the firm level and the collective 
level. We find however that essential patenting, as currently implemented in 3GPP, does not work 
the way it has been predicted (Shapiro 2001; Lemley 2002,2007)  as is prone to subjective re-
interpretation once standards and licensing agreements have been developed, which leads to 
possible hold-up situations and litigation. 
We also contribute to the policy debate about IP rights in the context of collective innovation. Our 
empirical study reveals that a practical solution to the limitations of current essential patenting has 
been found and implemented in the context of 3GPP: it consists in associating essential patenting 
policies to an ex-ante maximum royalty rate policy, which limits ex-post opportunistic behavior. This 
practical solution raises some concerns however, given the possibility of maximum royalty rate to be 
interpreted as anti-competitive by current antitrust regulation. We therefore raise the question of 
re-examining the potentially negative impact of antitrust regulation on collective innovation. The 
adoption of this practical solution, currently advocated by a number of firms involved in 3GPP (LTE 
2008), would require modifications in antitrust regulation and a more flexible approach to public 
policing of collective innovation. This paper therefore contributes to the innovation policy debate on 
the reform of the patent system and antitrust regulation (AMC 2007; Wright 2009; Zoettl et al. 2009) 
especially in the mobile sector (Balto 2004) by providing empirically-based insights in favor of 
examining the impact of competition policy on collective innovation challenges. 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
The private-collective model of innovation (von Hippel & von Krogh 2003) describes a model of 
technology development that combines established models of proprietary innovation with some 
collective aspects of innovation whereby firms relinquish ownership rights over resources to make 
them partially non-excludable (Alexy & Reitzig 2013). In the private-collective, firms contribute to 
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the production of a common technology (e.g. mobile communications, open source software) 
exhibiting public good characteristics.  
Private-Collective organizations can be considered a particular form of strategic alliance as firms 
engage in a web of agreements sharing the commitment to reach a common goal by pooling their 
resources and coordinating their activities (Teece 1992; von Hippel & von Krogh 2006; Enkel et al. 
2009; Huizingh 2011). In a similar manner to other sorts of strategic alliances, firms within the 
private-collective collaborate in research and development (Hagedoorn et al., 2000; Yasuda 2005), 
technology standardization and technology commercialization. 
A unique characteristic of private-collective, however, is the creation of pools of intellectual 
property rights (IPrights) which are made available to the community within the private-collective. 
The creation of shared patent pools have profound implications on innovation as, by partially 
waiving IP rights, firms within the private-collective reduce search and licensing transaction costs, as 
well as potential, ex-post, litigation (Von Hippel & von Krogh 2003; Garud & Kumaraswamy 1993; 
Fitzgerald 2006; Lerner & Tirole 2002b).  
By lessening licensing and litigation costs, firms within the private-collective are able to expand their 
strategic options for technology development; in addition to traditional appropriation mechanisms 
such as large portfolio patenting or technology manufacturing, firms are adopting alternative 
approaches focusing on developing a limited set of patents and contributing them to patent pools 
and standards with other firms (Fischer & Henkel 2013).  
Therefore private-collective as a model of innovation allows firms to implement strategies based on 
asset and knowledge specialization and value-capture strategies based on full technology package 
commercialization and IP rights. Examples of this model of innovation can be found in the software 
industry (von Krogh et al. 2003; Osterloh & Rota 2007) as well as in service and manufacturing (van 
de Vrande et al. 2009). 
In this sense the private-collective model of innovation is claimed by several authors as an effective 
organizational form to facilitate the development of markets for technology (Arora et al. 2004). 
Firms, however, often fail to benefit from inter-firm partnering, especially in technological contexts 
riddled with complex intellectual property regimes (Somaya 2003; Somaya et al. 2011), information 
and power asymmetries (Das & Teng 2000; Osborn & Baughn 1990), opportunistic behaviour 
(Williamson 1998; Gulati 1995) and managerial complexity (Park & Ungson 2001).  
Reasons for the high failure rates observed in inter-firm partnering are, among others:the 
performance and network ties (Olk & Young 1997), access to complementary resources, the 
evolution of the consortium itself (Hagedoorn et al., 2000; Hagedoorn 2002; Lunnan & Haugland 
2008) and the location of other strategic partners relative to the focal firm (Adner & Kapoor 2010). 
This is especially the case in contexts in which transactions are established at a vertical level (e.g. 
supplier-provider) and at a horizontal level between competitors (e.g. cross-licensing).  
As a result the firm’s ability to create and capture value from partnering with others is contingent on 
its market power, internal resources, activities outside the private-collective (Leiponen 2008; 
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Stuermer et al. 2009) and other firms, either internal or external, to the private-collective (Alexy & 
Reitzig 2003).  
Also of relevance in determining the success of any strategic partnering is the IPrights regime 
operating, especially if there are processes for standards development (Lemley 2002; Rysman & 
Simcoe 2008) and large network effects involved in standards adoption (Shapiro 2008; Chiao et al. 
2007; Schmalensee 2009). 
Literature on standard settings and intellectual property rights find significant weaknesses in current 
regimes for the management of IPrights that can provide perverse incentives for patent licensing 
firms to seek excessive rates of return as well as for licensees to minimize the economic value of the 
innovation embedded in the patent (Lichtman 2010; Treacy & Lawrance 2008; Schmalensee 2009 
).This not only impedes efficient markets for technology (Arora et al. 2004) but at the same time 
exposes the private-collective to exogenous stakeholders such as governmental agencies, antitrust 
and other legal systems (Lemley & Shapiro 1991; Lemley 2002, 2007) whose decisions can have a 
profound impact on the firm´s ability to innovate and extract economic value from it. 
In this regard this paper aims to contribute to a further understanding of the context that makes 
private-collective a sustainable model of collaborative innovation. More precisely, this paper 
investigates: (1) internal mechanisms of governance of IPrights whereby private-collective 
institutions can develop technologies and the resulting ability of the firm to benefit from them, as 
well as (2) the interplay between cooperation and competition in the context of private-collective. 
The former aspect is developed in section 2.1 with the latter in section 2.2. 
From a public policy perspective, providing insights on these matters is relevant given current 
debates on the reform of the patent system and antitrust regulation (AMC 2007; Wright 2009; Zoettl 
et al. 2009) especially in the mobile sector (Balto 2004). 
From a strategic and managerial perspective a better understanding of private-collective as a model 
of collaborative innovation would help firms´ managers to better assess positioning and 
coordination choices (Iansiti and Levien 2004), value chain configuration in the private-collective 
(Adner and Kapoor 2010) and the benefits, and risks, associated with adopting a private-collective  
model (Joshi & Nerkar2011). 
2.1. Coordination of innovation in the private-collective (First trade-off: coordination of 
collective innovation & proprietary innovation) 
The development of technologies within a Private-Collective organization involves a combination of 
many different components each of which may be the subject of one or more patents. In the 
information technology sector in particular, high-technology products such as microprocessors, cell 
phones, or memory devices can easily be covered by dozens or even hundreds of different patents. 
The fact that a large set of patents can affect a single technology creates a patent thicket (Shapiro 
2001) in which a set of patents, owned by different firms, overlap around the same technology. This 
might lead to complex patent hold-up situations resulting in (1) injunction threats and (2) royalty 
stacking. 
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2.1.1: Injunction threats 
Lemley (2007) shows that the threat of an injunction can enable a patent holder to negotiate 
royalties far in excess of the patent holder’s true economic contribution, ideally represented as a 
reasonable royalty level.  
The royalty rate that would be reasonable and expected in the ideal patent system, without any 
element of hold-up is contingent on factors such as the value of the patented feature for the 
downstream firm, the margin per unit earned by the downstream firm on its product, the strength of 
the patent, the cost to the downstream firm of redesigning its product to avoid infringing the patent 
claims as well as the bargaining skills of the patent holder among others. 
The negotiated royalty rate, however, depends upon the downstream firm’s best strategy in the 
event that negotiations with the patent holder break down. In the case of litigation the owner of the 
patent gains great bargaining leverage from its ability to threaten to force the downstream firm from 
the market if the patent is found valid and infringed (Shapiro 2008). An alternative would be for the 
accused infringer to avoid the risk of disruption in its business by redesigning the product even while 
litigating, particularly if the cost of redesign is relatively low in comparison with profits that the 
downstream firm would lose by withdrawing from the market while redesigning its product. In any 
case, the patent holder benefits greatly from the fact that the downstream firm’s threat point in the 
negotiations involves incurring redesign costs.   
The threat that a patent holder will obtain an injunction that will force the downstream producer to 
pull its product from the market can be very powerful. These threats can greatly affect licensing 
negotiations, especially in cases where the injunction is based on a patent covering one small 
component of a complex, profitable, and popular product (USITC 2013; Economist 2013). Some 
situations of this phenomenon can be found in the mobile industry in which Apple and Samsung, 
formerly engaged in collaborative innovation, have recently resorted to litigation over IP rights 
(Forbes 2013a). 
A number of private-collective institutions have adopted open policies of IP rights management 
whereby firms abide to a complete waiver of their patents. In what is known as the open source 
movement, patents associated with actual, or derived, innovations remain open and free for 
everyone to use (Lakhani & von Hippel 2003; Lerner & Tirole 2002a). Arguably this model of IP right 
management greatly diminishes risks associated with injunction threats. 
In other instances of private-collective modes of innovation the excessive bargaining power hold by 
patent owners is compensated via two mechanisms: Essential patents and FRAND licensing (Lemley 
2007; Farrell et al. 2007). 
Patents are considered essential if they are considered to be indispensable to manufacture a 
standard-compliant technology (Bekkers et al. 2011). More precisely essentiality is a characteristic 
by which it is not possible on technical grounds to make, sell, lease otherwise dispose of, repair, use 
or operate equipment or methods which comply with a standard without infringing on that IPR (ETSI 
2013).  
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Essential patents not only address the injunction problem but also define technical interfaces 
required to ensure ex-post interoperability at a vertical (between subcomponents) and horizontal 
(among competitors) level. 
Under a FRAND policy of licensing, firms within the private-collective abide to license on a Fair, 
Reasonable and Non Discriminatory (i.e., FRAND) basis. This mechanism is especially important in 
the case of essential patents as it effectively limits the monopolistic power which is granted to the 
owner of the essential patent (Lemley & Shapiro 1991).  
2.1.2. Royalty stacking 
Royalty stacking refers to situations in which a single product potentially infringes on many patents, 
and thus may bear multiple royalty burdens. The term “royalty stacking” reflects the fact that, from 
the prospective of the firm making the product in question, all of the different claims for royalties 
must be added or “stacked” together to determine the total royalty borne by the product if the firm 
is to sell that product free of patent litigation.  The existence of such “royalty stacking” exacerbates 
the hold-up problem as downstream firms (1) face infringement claims from multiple owners and (2) 
are charged more than the marginal costs associated to each patent (Shapiro 2001). Moreover 
royalty stacking may lead to a situation in which output is depressed even below the level that 
would be set by a vertically integrated monopolist.  
In regards to the royalty stacking problem, firms engaged in the private-collective establish a 
maximum royalty rate for the technology as a whole (e.g. smartphone) thus avoiding potential 
unsustainable situations (Franzinger 2003). 
These three mechanisms (Essential patenting, FRAND licensing and maximum royalty rates) make 
possible the implementation of pools of IP rights within the private-collective upon which 
collaborative innovation can take place1. We contend therefore that these mechanisms are critical 
for the sustainability and effectiveness of private-collective modes of innovation. 
In order to empirically test the influence of these mechanisms in the governance of private-collective 
modes of innovation, we suggest the following hypotheses: 
H1a. FRAND licensing is positively associated with firms’ perception of their ability to develop 
technologies under Private-Collective contexts. 
H1b. Essential patents are positively associated with firms’ perception of their ability to develop 
technologies under Private-Collective contexts. 
H1c.  Maximum royalty rate policies are positively associated with firms’ perception of their ability 
to develop technologies under Private-Collective contexts. 
                                                          
1
We note in passing that open sourcing can be considered as a particular instance of IP right pooling in which 
FRAND is a “de facto” policy and there are no royalties associated at all 
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2.2. Coordination and competition in the private-collective (Second trade-off: 
coordination of collective innovation & competition) 
Previous section hypothesizes the relevance of Essential patents, FRAND licensing and maximum 
royalty rates in private-collective modes of innovation.  These mechanisms can (1) nurture 
innovation and technology improvement and (2) promote compatibility at a horizontal and vertical 
level. In the case of mobile technologies a consumer can substitute one brand of smartphone for 
another in the same mobile network; in a similar manner smartphone manufacturers can be 
reassured that their products will operate across mobile networks (Hovenkamp 2007). In this sense 
section 2.1 contends the beneficial effect of the three mechanisms in reducing transaction costs 
involved in presence of overlapping IP rights (i.e. patent thickets). 
These instruments however may run counter to competition, therefore raising antitrust concerns. 
Essential patents, a set of technical specifications agreed within the private-collective that provides a 
common design for a technology, may facilitate both collusion and exclusion (Lemley 2002). 
Collusion is possible as an essential patent, by definition, minimizes differentiation and makes 
technologies readily observable which in turn facilitates the emergence of cartels (Hovenkamp 2005; 
Scherer & Ross 1990; Viscusi et al. 2005). 
Conferring the status of essentiality to a certain set of patents arguably entails some exclusionary 
risks as owners of essential patents can exert excessive market power given the cumulative nature of 
technological development (ref to cumulative innovation), significant network effects (ref: network 
externalities) and patent hold-up (Lemley 2007). Previous section presented FRAND licensing as a 
counterbalancing mechanism to limit the exclusionary power granted by an essential patent.   
Established competition rules on horizontal cooperation agreements explicitly prohibit agreements 
which have as their object the restriction of competition. For there to be restrictive effects on 
competition, essential patent and maximum rate policies must have, or be likely to have an 
appreciable adverse impact on at least one of the parameters of competition on the market, such as 
price, output, product quality and variety, or innovation (Whish & Bailey 2012; EC2013).  
From a practical perspective established legal practises, e.g. the European Union (EC2013), 
implement four cumulative conditions which must be met for co-operation agreements to be 
considered beneficial in the sense of providing efficiency gains offsetting potential restriction on 
competition, (1) must lead to economic benefits, (2) restrictions must be indispensable to generate 
efficiency gains, (3) consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting efficiency gains, (4) the 
agreement must offer the parties no possible elimination of competition in relation to a substantial 
part of the products in question. 
Hypotheses H1a to H2c partially apply these four criteria to test any potential restriction on 
competition due to essential patenting, FRAND licensing and maximum royalty rate policies. Based 
on the analysis above, we contend that: 
H2a. FRAND licensing is positively associated with firms’ perception of their ability to compete in 
Private-Collective contexts. 
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H2b. Essential patenting is positively associated with firms’ perception of their ability to compete 
in Private-Collective contexts. 
H2c.  Maximum royalty rate policies are positively associated with firms’ perception of their ability 
to compete in Private-Collective contexts. 
3. Data collection and analytical methods  
Our hypotheses require the identification of a setting in which firms federate around a private-
collective organizational form for the purposes of technological development and 
commercialization.  
To adequately characterize the impact of IPrights mechanisms on innovation (hyp.H1a-c) we need 
data corresponding to private-collectives that have formal mechanisms in place, patent licensing 
firms and patent licensees. In order to do a similar analysis, this time applied to competition (hyp. H2 
a-c), we also need an instance of a private-collective in which firms engage in collaborative research 
whilst competing in subsequent stages of technology commercialization. 
3.1. The setting: 3GPP 
The third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) provides a setting that uniquely lends itself to the 
test of our hypotheses is the third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). It is composed of 
standardization bodies from Asia, Europe and North America (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TTA, TTC), 
market representation partners (IMS forum, IPv6 forum, UMTS forum, GSM association) as well as 
patent-intensive multinationals (Ericsson, Huawei, Motorola, Nokia, Qualcomm), technology 
consumers (e.g. telecommunication operators) and small technology-intensive firms.  
In this domain, as documented in 3GPP (2007) and Leiponen (2008), 3GPP produces Technical 
Specifications, to be transposed by relevant Standardization Bodies into appropriate deliverables 
(e.g., standards). 
3GPP inherited most of its operating procedures from the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI), retaining their approach to open membership, mechanism for the management of 
intellectual property rights, committee structure and working procedures, ETSI (2013). Contrary to 
ETSI, however, 3GPP is a clear departure from the government-led approach to technical 
standardization as in this case technological development is leaded by private firms. 
Mandated by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 3GPP members start working 
collaboratively on the development of a new set of technical specifications (e.g., 4th generation 
mobile) which are in turn transposed by standardization bodies into formal standards. With 
standards in place private firms are able to start competing in the market mostly based on price and 
value-added offerings (service and support, complementary technologies). 
Market figures seem to support 3GPP as an effective institution to develop technological markets 
with circa six thousand million mobile subscriptions globally using 3GPP systems which makes 90% of 
the total mobile market today (Economist 2012b; Forbes 2013b; GSA 2013)  
9 
 
3.2. Data 
Initially a list of firms involved in 3GPP for the past decade was collected in order to conduct an 
analysis of their research intensity, as measured by number of conventional patents, essential 
patents (Bekkers et al. 2011; Phelps & Milone 2012) and engineers assigned to work on 3GPP-related 
technology development (3GPP 2013b). 
A preliminary analysis of the dataset reveals the existence of three different groups based on the 
number of engineers firms commit to developing technologies within 3GPP, the number of total 
patents related to mobile technologies, the number of essential patents and the number of years 
that the firm has been involved in 3GPP. Table 1 depicts a clear separation in three categories: (1) 
firms exhibiting high research intensity (measured in terms of patent portfolio, essential patents and 
engineers); (2) firms with lower levels of research intensity but similar periods of involvement; (3) 
firms with shorter periods of involvement and resources committed, (see Table 1). 
Further analysis, reveals that group 1 corresponds to large firms (e.g. Ericsson, Samsung, Nokia) 
specialized in developing and commercializing new mobile technologies whereas group 2 
corresponds to large firms (e.g. Japan Telecom, China Unicom, O2) whose main business model is 
based on providing mobile services to end customers. The third group is consisted of small firms 
with specialized technologies (e.g., security, geopositioning) and lower capacity for research.  
Table 1. Initial analysis of firms participating in 3GPP 
Group 
Number of 
mobile related 
patents 
Number of mobile related 
essential 
Patents 
Number of 
engineers 
involved 
Number of 
Years 
Involved 
     Large Producers 5105.826 30.60606 21.48485 6.909091 
Large Consumers 1294.444 . 8.714286 5.142857 
Small Producers 40 . 2.5 2.833333 
     A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA, Wooldridge 2012) confirms the existence of three 
different categories, according to the p-values obtained (0.0282<0.05) (see Table 2). 
Table 2. MANOVA analysis of firms involved in 3GPP 
Number of obs = 32 
W = Wilks' lambda L = Lawley-Hotelling trace 
P = Pillai's trace R = Roy's largest root 
  
Source Statistic df F(df1, df2) = F Prob>F  
Groupmember W 0.6780 1 4, 27  3.21 0.0282 e 
 P 0.3220  4, 27  3.21 0.0282 e 
 L 0.4749  4, 27  3.21 0.0282 e 
 R 0.4749  4, 27  3.21 0.0282 e 
Residual 30 
Total 31 
e = exact, a = approximate, u = upper bound on F 
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3.3. Interviews 
For the purposes of triangulating among different sources of evidence, in addition to a quantitative 
analysis, a series of one-to-one interviews were arranged with relevant stakeholders. In total 6 in-
depth interviews with managers from Ericsson (2) and ETSI (2), a civil servant at the European Union 
involved in antitrust matters and one engineer formerly involved in standardization processes at 
3GPP. 
The interviews offered a rich perspective of 3GPP confirming the existence of several mechanisms 
formally established among the 3GPP community: Essential patent mechanism, FRAND licensing 
obligation in the case of essential patents and consensus-based decision making among others. 
Maximum royalty rate policy is a mechanism which, if not formally made explicit in 3GPP´s 
procedures, is broadly agreed among firms in parallel negotiations according to experts interviewed. 
3.4. Survey 
Given the existence of three groups of firms with potentially conflicting interests (see Table 1) we 
conduct three different surveys, one for each group identified (large producers, large consumers, 
small producers). Preliminary interviews conducted prior to the survey lead us to be attentive to the 
difference between managerial roles (e.g. legal, strategy) and technical roles (e.g. engineers). 
The survey was circulated electronically to a total of 205 representatives of the large producer 
category (e.g. engineers working at Nokia, Ericsson, Qualcomm, Alcatel-Lucent), 123 representatives 
of the large consumer category (e.g. Vodafone, ATT, France Telecom) and 40 from the small 
producer category. The response rate was 28.3%, 23.6% and 0.05% respectively. Unfortunately, the 
lack of sufficient responses from the small producer category leads us to eliminate this group from 
subsequent analysis. 
3GPP, in a similar manner to other Private-Collective organizations, needs to address two main 
trade-offs for sustainable technology developments and subsequent diffusion to market: on the one 
hand it must find an adequate balance between coordination of collective innovation and firm’s 
private interests, on the other hand it must ensure that collective innovation does not impede 
competition (and thus avoid antitrust concerns). 
In regards to the first trade-off, we ask to a representative sample of the 3GPP community their 
preference, on a Likert scale, for each IPrights mechanism in terms of diffusion of the focal firm’s 
innovations (Q3), as well as innovation activity resulting within the private-collective (Q4). Refer to 
Table 3 for more details on the questionnaire. 
In regards to the second trade-off, we ask to the same set of respondents how they find the three 
coordination mechanisms under consideration in terms of the ability of the firm to compete (Q1), to 
protect their innovation (Q2), the ability of the private-collective to develop new markets (Q5), the 
ability of the private-collective to protect innovations from external infringement (Q6) and 
facilitating the development of alternative technology offerings (Q7). 
Finally respondents rate, on a Likert scale, their overall perception of 3GPP as an effective institution 
in terms of innovation and competition (Q8,Q8’,Q9’Q9’). This approach is in the tradition of earlier 
empirical studies that relied on subjective assessments of the effectiveness of appropriability 
mechanisms (Cohen et al. 2000; Fisher & Henkel 2012).  
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In addition to controlling for the firms’ strategic positioning (via the categorization into three 
categories), the results of preliminary interviews justified defining another variable (Role) controlling 
for the role played by the respondent in the firm (i.e. technical versus managerial). Finally a third 
variable, “Layer”, controls for the respondent’s experience in lower layers of 3GPP (e.g. radio 
transmission) versus higher ones (e.g. charging and billing, internet) (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Survey instrument 
Variable Sub variables Dimension measured Unit of 
analysis 
Values 
Q1 Q11,Q12,Q13,Q14 Impact of each mechanism on the firm’s 
ability to compete 
 
Private 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5-point likert 
scale 
(strongly 
disagree-
strongly 
agree) 
Q2 Q21,Q22,Q23,Q24 Impact of each mechanism on the firm’s 
ability to protect their innovations 
Q3 Q31,Q32,Q33,Q34 Impact of each mechanism on the firm’s 
ability to diffuse their innovations 
Q4 Q41,Q42,Q43,Q44 Impact of each mechanism on the ability 
of the collective as a whole to solve 
important technical problems? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collective 
Q5 Q51,Q52,Q53,Q54 Impact of each mechanism on the ability 
of the collective as a whole to collectively 
create new markets 
Q6 Q61,Q62,Q63,Q64 Impact of each mechanism on the ability 
of the collective as a whole to protect 
internal innovations from infringement 
or unfair competition 
Q7 Q71,Q72,Q73,Q74 Impact of each mechanism on the ability 
of the collective as a whole to facilitate 
different technology offerings from 
competing firms? 
Q8  Does 3GPP stimulate innovation and 
technology development in the mobile 
industry. 
Q8’  Does 3GPP help firms to innovate and 
develop technologies in the mobile 
market ? 
Q9  Does 3GPP stimulate competition in the 
mobile market ? 
Q9’  Does 3GPP help my firm to compete in 
the mobile market ? 
Group  Firm’s strategic positioning (technology 
producer, technology consumer) 
 (0,1) 
Role  Respondent’s role in the company 
(technical versus managerial) 
 (0,1) 
Layer  Respondent’s experience in 3GPP (lower 
layer, upper layer, both) 
 (0,1,2) 
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4. Empirical results  
4.1. Coordination of innovation 
Table 4 reports summary statistics for the variables considered in regards to coordination of 
collective innovation, measured via questions Q3,Q4, Q8 and Q8’. The results as described below 
provide evidence supporting FRAND, essential patenting and maximum royalty rate policy as 
beneficial for innovation purposes in 3GPP (hyp.H1). 
The preliminary analysis of data presented in section 3.3 revealed a large heterogeneity of members 
involved in 3GPP with three main groups: large technology producers, large technology consumers 
and small firms (the latter not being considered due to lack of sufficient data available). In order to 
test for any significant difference we entertain an ordered logit regression controlling for the 
variables Group, Layer and Role. Thus Table 5 represents the proportional odds ratios for a one unit 
increase in the control variables Role, Layer and Group on the dependent variables (Q3, Q4). 
Table 4.Impact of mechanisms for Coordination of innovation in 3GPP (descriptive analysis) 
   Quantile 
 Variable N Min .25 Median .75 Max 
Essential 
patents 
(private) 
Q31 87 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Essential 
patents 
(collective) 
Q41 87 2.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
FRAND 
(private) 
Q32 87 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
Q33 87 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
 
FRAND 
(collective) 
Q42 87 2.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
Q43 87 1.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
Maximum 
Royalty rate 
(private) 
Q34 87 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Maximum 
Royalty rate 
(collective) 
Q44 87 2.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
3GPP and 
innovation 
Q8 87 2.00 3.00   4.00 5.00 5.00 
Q8’ 87 3.00 3.00   4.00 4.00 5.00 
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Table 5.Influence of the control variables Role, Layer, Group (ordered logit)  
 Essential Patents FRAND Maximum royalty 
rate 
Overall 
perception: 3GPP 
and innovation  
Control 
variable 
Collective 
level 
(Q31) 
Firm level 
(Q41) 
Collective 
level 
(Q32) 
Firm level 
(Q33) 
Collective 
level 
(Q42) 
Firm level 
(Q43) 
Collective 
level 
(Q34) 
Firm level 
(Q44) 
Q8 Q8’ 
           
Role 32.1***   
(28.1) 
22.5***  
(17.3) 
12.7**  
(10.9) 
98.5***   
(97.5) 
18.6***  
(16.0) 
10.7***   
(7.4) 
4.21**  
(3.0) 
7.04***  
(5.1) 
6.16** 
(4.2) 
40.8***  
(33.5) 
Layer     1.79**  
(0.54) 
    0.55**   
(0.15) 
Group 5.6***   
(2.88) 
2.4**  
(1.1) 
5.6**  
(3.2) 
   3.7***  
(1.8) 
4.05***  
(2.03) 
  
           
Prob> 
chi2 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.004 0.036 0.000 
 
4.1.1. Essential patent mechanism 
As far as the essential patent mechanism is concerned the results presented in Table 4 indicate a 
general consensus on its relevance for innovation purposes for the collective (Median Q41=4) with 
less support at the firm level (Median Q31=3). 
We note a statistically significant influence of being a manager and a high scoring of the essential 
patent mechanism as an innovation enabler at both the firm and the collective level (32.1 and 22.5 
respectively) (see Table 5). There exists some differences between the type of company under 
consideration as large technology consumers (e.g. telcos) exhibit larger odds of scoring essential 
patent as an important mechanism compared to technology producers(5.6 and 2.4 respectively). 
According to an interviewee “The existence of essential patents is a two-edged sword. It is good that 
patents are classified as essential as then limits can be set on the amount of money that are charged 
for those patents (via FRAND). The problem with essential patents is that companies spend time in 
3GPP trying to get their essential patents adopted, whether that is for the common good or not. This 
slows down the agreement process (as companies will hold out to the last to get their patented 
technology accepted)... the 3GPP process can be glacial because of essential patents and some odd 
decisions are made because of them”. 
Associated costs to essential patenting are mostly borne exclusively by the large producer group (the 
owners of essential patents) whereas large consumers benefit from a well-defined legal and 
technological context delineated by the essential patent mechanism, this would support the 
different perception observed in relation to the essential patent mechanism. 
According to the results of the research the essential patent mechanism seem to play several roles in 
the process of collective innovation, (1) provides a legal instrument to ensure a return on investment 
on innovations, (2) delineates intellectual property rights around precise bundles of technologies 
(e.g. LTE in 4th generation), (3) ensures technical interoperability by defining a technological 
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standard. Hence we obtain support for the mechanism of essential patent as a relevant enabler of 
collaborative innovation in 3GPP (H1.b). 
4.1.2. FRAND mechanism 
The results presented in Table 4 reveal a strong support of FRAND as a relevant mechanism for 
facilitating innovation within 3GPP both at the firm level (Median: Q32=4, Q33=4) and the collective 
one (Median: Q42=4, Q43=4) .  
The interviews conducted reveal that FRAND plays an important role in ensuring a collaborative 
environment in which innovation and technology development can take place.  
 As mentioned by one of the ETSI member interviewed“....3GPP tries to balance the private interests 
of the firms and the collective mostly via consensus-based decision making and FRAND licensing 
policies.... if someone is not prepared to license an essential technology following a FRAND policy 
then that technology is removed from the standard”. 
This official policy of establishing compulsory FRAND licensing in the case of essential patents 
emerges as a key governance mechanism within 3GPP to avoid hold-up situations such as the one 
documented in (ref. Rambus). Also compulsory FRAND licensing provides a limit to the power 
extended to any essential patent holder.  
In this sense we observe a clear complementary role between the FRAND mechanism and the 
essential patent mechanism as both are required to overcome hold-up situations (Shapiro 2001, 
2008) and thus foster collaborative innovation in private-collective contexts.  
Based on the results presented in Table 5 we notice a statistically significant influence on the control 
variable Role on the odds of a high scoring of FRAND at a firm level (12.7, 98.5) and at a collective 
level (18.6,10.7). This result suggests that managers involved in 3GPP exhibit stronger appreciation 
than engineers for FRAND as a strategic mechanism for innovation in the private-collective. 
As far as the other control variables Layer and Group are concerned, the results lead us to conclude 
that there are no statistically significant differences neither among the type of company (technology 
producers vs. technology consumers) nor the layer in which the interviewee has been involved (5.6, 
2.4).  
Both empirical results and personal interviews conducted among experts in the field support FRAND 
as an innovation enabler in private-collective contexts (H1.a), moreover it seems to be a general 
consensus among firms and technological contexts on the importance of this mechanism. 
4.1.3. Maximum royalty rate 
Maximum royalty rate policies are not part of the 3GPP model of governance in order to avoid 
potential antitrust measures. Moreover all of the people interviewed who are directly involved with 
3GPP, EU legislation and ETSI employees, preferred not to comment on the implications of having 
maximum royalty rates. However some of them indirectly expressed the necessity of limiting the 
potential of licensing revenues accruing for an essential patent: “You have to make sure that the cost 
of IP of each product or technology is not excessive. You need to make sure that the total cost of the 
product does not become excessive because of the intellectual property rights involved.” 
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Two managers from a large technology vendor explicitly confirmed that maximum royalty rates are 
usually agreed during licensing negotiations among companies to avoid royalty stacking specially in 
the case of patent pool licensing: “Our company usually pursues royalty rates agreements at around 
8% of the total cost of the product, for instance a smartphone”. 
A policy of limiting royalty rates accrued from the licensing of essential patents (i.e. maximum 
royalty rate mechanism) is considered beneficial especially at the collective level (Median Q44=4) 
with less support at the firm level (Median Q34=3).  
Managers exhibit stronger valuations for maximum royalty rate mechanism both for their firms and 
the collective (5.45, 10.85) according to Table 5. On a similar manner, technology consumers exhibit 
larger odds of scoring maximum royalty rate as an important mechanism compared to technology 
producers (3.7, 4.05), clearly reflecting the beneficial effect of having a cap on the expected costs 
associated with acquiring the rights to have access to patent pools.  All of the above indicate support 
for Hypothesis H1.c. 
4.2. Collaborative innovation && competition 
Table 6 reports summary statistics for the mayor variables considered in regards to competition, 
measured via questions Q1,Q2, Q5,Q6,Q7,Q9 and Q9’. 
Table 6. Impact of mechanisms for competition in 3GPP (descriptive analysis) 
 
  
Quantile 
 Variable n Min .25 Median .75 Max 
Essential patents 
(private) 
Q11 87 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
Q21 87 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
 
 
Essential patents 
(collective) 
Q51 
87 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Q61 
87 1.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Q71 
87 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
FRAND 
(private) 
Q12 87 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 
Q13 87 2.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
Q22 87 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
Q23 87 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
FRAND 
Q52 
87 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
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(collective) 
Q53 
87 1.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
Q62 
87 1.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
Q63 
87 1.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
Q72 
87 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Q73 
87 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
Maximum 
Royalty rate 
(private) 
Q14 87 2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
Q24 87 2.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
Maximum 
Royalty rate 
(collective) 
Q54 
87 2.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
Q64 
87 1.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
Q74 
87 1.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
3GPP and 
competition 
Q9 87 2.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
Q9’ 87 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
 
4.2.1. Essential patents mechanism 
Results of Table 6 indicate that, essential patents which are considered beneficial at the firm level 
(Median: Q11=4, Q21=4), are however, not perceived as beneficial at the collective level (Median: 
Q51=3, Q61=3, Q71=3). This latter result indicates some potential causality between the essential 
patent mechanism and the inability of 3GPP as a collective to compete against other technologies 
provided by the market. 
In order to further investigate this phenomenon collected market information on essential patents, 
also specific questions during the interviews were formulated. 
Our interview data analysis suggests reasons why this might be the case. A number of interviewees 
with relevant positions in 3GPP (technology delegates) pointed out that the process of defining 
which patent becomes essential is cumbersome and subject to large negotiation processes, “... this 
slows down the agreement process and causes 3GPP to stall in the definition of new technologies 
and products...”, “...The process of defining what becomes an essential patent has worked incredibly 
well in some parts of the mobile ecosystem (radio technologies) however it is not as efficient in 
other parts in which markets are much more dynamic... as is the case in internet services or end 
customer applications .... a clear example is Skype, a non-3GPP technology that has prevailed over 
3GPP-defined alternatives”. 
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A prominent member of ETSI stated that an overarching problem with the actual process of essential 
patenting is the fact that firms are free to claim essentiality to their patents as they see fit thus 
leaving room for an ex-post interpretation of essentiality (and royalties involved) and in many cases 
to litigation in court. Current reality around patent litigation in the mobile industry confirms this 
situation (Economist 2011, 2012; FT 2012; Forbes 2012, 2013a). 
An analysis of the distribution of essential patents within 3GPP reveals a high concentration of this 
kind of patent in large, technology intensive, multinationals, in detriment to others such as small 
firms or technology consumers such as telecom operators or smartphone manufacturers (see Table 
7).  Therefore it is reasonable to believe in the existence of some power asymmetries within 3GPP 
induced by the ownership, or lack of, essential patents as well as the process of negotiating ex-post 
what is considered “essential”.  
Table 7. Essential patent distribution in 3GPP (LTE technologies) 
 4th generation mobile 
families declared 
Patents considered 
essential 
Percentage 
Nokia 102 57 54.29 
Qualcomm 26 8 7.62 
Ericsson 24 14 13.33 
Nortel Networks 17 7 6.67 
Sony Corporation 12 8 7.62 
Interdigital 11 2 1.90 
TI 6 1 0.95 
LG 4 3 2.86 
Huawei 3 1 0.95 
ETRI 2 1 0.95 
Matsushita 1 1 0.95 
NEC 1 1 0.95 
Alcatel 1 0 0.00 
DirecTV 1 1 0.95 
Totals 210 105  
 
One interviewee recognized the inherent asymmetries in the essential patent mechanism: “if two 
large vendors own essential patents they exchange them and everyone is happy..... however patent 
purchasers need to pay for access to patent portfolios.... and this is where you get the tension... 
Essential patents are not perfect but it is the best mechanism we have at the moment”. 
Hence we obtain partial support of the essential patent mechanism as a competition enabler in 
private-collective contexts (H2.b).More specifically the results of this section suggest that, being 
essential patenting relevant for competition purposes, the processes as defined in 3GPP slow-down 
technology commercialization as well as induce ex-post subjective interpretation (and hence 
litigation). 
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4.2.2. FRAND mechanism 
FRAND licensing, which becomes compulsory in the case of essential patents, is a measure to 
counter the power granted to the owner of an essential patent. In this sense FRAND is a competition 
enabler as it precludes monopolistic practises by forcing companies to grant licenses on a similar 
basis to every firm, moreover the obligation to license on a FRAND basis is extended not just to 3GPP 
members but also to every external firm. The obligation to broaden the FRAND scope to external 
parties constitutes an important feature to enact the concept of open patent pools, an important 
requisite in antitrust legislation. 
The results presented in Table 6 reveal a strong support of FRAND as a relevant mechanism to 
facilitate competition both at the firm level (Median: Q12=4, Q13=4, Q22=4, Q23=3) and the collective 
one (Median: Q52=4, Q53=4, Q62=4, Q63=4). The above presented results thus provide support for 
FRAND as a mechanism that is relevant in facilitating competition in private-collective institutions 
(H2.a). 
4.2.3. Maximum royalty rate 
In regards to the impact of maximum royalty rate policies on competition, the results provide 
support for hypotheses H2.c, both at the firm and the collective level (Median Q14=4, Q24=4) and 
(Q54=4, Q64=4, Q74=3) respectively. This confirms maximum royalty rate policy as a beneficial 
instrument that facilitates competition in private-collective institutions. 
5. Discussion, limitations and conclusions 
The results of this paper extend existing theory on the private-collective model of innovation by 
characterizing how collective innovation takes place in current technological contexts such as the 
Internet, and mobile. Earlier work on private-collective models of innovation (von Hippel & von 
Krogh 2006; Alexy & Reitzig 2013; Boudreau 2012) has not examined empirically the extent to which 
IP rights policy implementation affected members ability to innovate and to compete. Our study 
highlights the importance of three mechanisms: FRAND, essential patents and maximum royalty rate 
to overcome patent fragmentation and patent holdup.  
In this sense this paper reveals a set of mechanisms whereby private-collective organizations 
effectively manage two trade-offs: (1) the conflicting interests between the private (i.e. firms) and 
the collective (e.g. standards setting and its adoption by the market) as a whole, and (2) conflicts of 
interest between collaborative innovation and antitrust authorities. 
With regards to the first trade-off, essential patenting is a mechanism providing legal and technical 
context upon which private value capture and technological development can occur whereas  
compulsory FRAND licensing and maximum royalty rate policy as mechanisms required to ensure 
value creation at the collective level via cumulative innovation (Bessant 1998) and the development 
of patent pools (Lerner & Tirole 2002b).  
With regards to the second trade-off, the limiting power of both FRAND compulsory licensing and 
maximum royalty rate policy lead to economic benefits and efficiency gains within the collective, 
moreover the fact that compulsory FRAND applies also to external firms constitutes an open patent 
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pool system whereby non-affiliated firms can license technologies developed by the private-
collective.  
5.1 Limitations 
As with every empirical study, our analysis is subject to several data-related limitations.  First, our 
results are obtained in one large, albeit specific, context (3GPP). Further research on private-
collective as a model of innovation could test the results of this paper in other settings for instance 
the internet engineering task force (IETF) or the Apache software community. 
The lack of sufficient responses from small firms limits the conclusions of this paper to 
multinationals, antitrust authorities and standardization agencies. In this regard, we would suggest 
future analysis on the ability of small firms to protect their innovations and compete in private-
collectives dominated by large multinationals. 
In regards to the instruments for the management of IPrights within the private-collective, this paper 
only considers three of them (i.e. FRAND, essential patenting and maximum royalty rate), there are 
however other important mechanisms required to reach consensus and avoid negotiation stalling 
that would deserve further analysis. 
Market data (GSA 2013), the results of the survey and interviews conducted provide evidence on the 
ability of 3GPP to compete worldwide against technological alternatives. An unexpected insight 
emerging from two interviews is the existence of two clearly separated technological families within 
3GPP, one corresponding to technologies associated with radio communications (termed as the 
“lower layer”) and other corresponding with internet services and mobile applications (“upper 
layer”). Engineers expressed some concerns on the adequacy of the 3GPP model of innovation in the 
upper layer as, according to them, the rapid technological pace in the case of internet services 
rendered 3GPP not agile enough to respond to the market. This apparent inability of 3GPP to 
compete in agile markets might have some relationship with the observed lack of small firms 
involved in 3GPP compared to other private-collectives such as the open source movement (von 
Hippel & von Krogh 2003, 2006 ; von Krogh et al. 2003 ) or Android (Tilson et al. 2012).  
5.2 Implications for Management theory  
This study contributes to the private collective literature as it is the first, to our knowledge, that 
explores empirically how the management of IP rights affects the ability of a private collective 
organization to both innovate and compete. We have found that the manner in which IP rights 
instruments are implemented in practice has a profound impact on shaping the process and the 
outcome of collective innovation in private collective organizations. 
The literature on the management of IPrights has focused mostly on standard-setting organizations, 
and the majority of these studies focus on single mechanisms, which do not allow researchers to 
explore the interaction between these IP rights mechanisms. Our results reveal strong 
complementarity between FRAND, essentiality and royalty revenue structures. Moreover we have 
found that the manner in which these mechanisms are implemented in practice (i.e. before or after 
standard adoption takes place) have a profound impact on their effectiveness. 
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Previous research (Treacy & Lawrance 2008) has highlighted inherent weaknesses in the FRAND 
mechanism, focusing on its inherent ambiguity. The results of this paper however support FRAND as 
an effective mechanism in the way it is currently implemented in 3GPP. In this 3GPP case, 
participants concerns lie not in FRAND but in the ex-post interpretation of essentiality by licensees. 
This would reinforce the necessity of integrative perspectives in order to gain a complete 
understanding of current regimes for collaborative innovation (and their shortcomings). 
Following Gulati (1998) the governance structure of the private-collective can be defined as the 
formal contractual structure participants use to formalize the partnership. Choices of governance 
structure are moderated by appropriability concerns (Pisano et al. 1988; Pisano 1989; Balakrishnan 
& Koza 1993) as well as coordination costs resulting from the extent of interdependence expected 
by the partners.  
The results of our research confirm both appropriability and coordination costs as determinants in 
the choice of governance structure and the ability to innovate. In addition, we find that power 
asymmetries due to firm’s size or IP right ownership do also play a moderating role in how the 
governance structure is designed.   
As far as the 3GPP is concerned, its governance structure could be assimilated to a contractual 
alliance whereby members of the partnering firms work together within their organizational 
boundaries (Gulati 1998). 3GPP facilitates unidirectional agreements such as licensing, second-
sourcing, distribution agreements as well as bidirectional agreements such as joint contracts and 
technology exchanges. 
Unlike conventional contractual alliances though, the 3GPP provides administrative hierarchies with 
rules and responsibilities for each member of the private-collective (e.g. FRAND regime for essential 
patents) thereby resembling a joint venture mechanism of innovation. In this case administrative 
hierarchy is provided via consensus-based processes for technology development and well defined 
(albeit not necessarily well enforced) policies for the management of intellectual property rights. 
Our paper thus provides insights on the challenges arising in governance structures within   
federations of innovators which are also competitors, and inform related scholarly conversations on 
the importance and difficulty to formulate and implement governance structures that maintain 
incentives to innovate privately as well as collectively, in the face of technological and relational 
uncertainty.  
The results of our study also hold implications for the various literatures that are addressing the 
issue of collective innovation. Task modularization (Sanchez 1995; Baldwin & Clark 2000), the 
pervasiveness of information and communication technologies, combined with the wide global 
distribution of skills and knowledge, are displacing the locus of innovation from within firms to 
networks of innovators (Baldwin & Von Hippel 2011; Chesbrough 2003).Beyond the literature on 
private collective models, literatures on technological platforms (Gawer & Cusumano 2002; Gawer & 
Henderson 2007; Gawer 2009, 2014; Boudreau 2010; Boudreau & Hagiu 2009; Eisenmann 2008; 
Eisenmann et al. 2011, Nambisan and Sawhney 2011;Tiwana et al. 2010), innovation ecosystems 
(Adner & Kapoor 2010), ecologies of innovation (Dougherty & Dunne 2011) and meta-organizations 
(Gulati et al. 2012), all examine the modalities of organization, management, and governance of 
network of innovators.  
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5.3 Implications for policy makers: 
As revealed in the case of 3GPP some forms of private-collective can mitigate limitations of current 
regulation of intellectual property rights (e.g. patent system) and effectively articulate sustainable 
regimes for collective innovation. Antitrust authorities are acknowledging the important role played 
by private-collective modes of innovation in complex technological regimes by explicitly granting 
legal coverage (AMC 2007; Balto 2004).  
The results of the interviews conducted and the survey support 3GPP as an institution that nurtures 
innovation (medians: Q8=4, Q8’=4) while allowing competition both within 3GPP and in external 
markets (medians: Q9=4, Q9’=4). 3GPP though, seems to have a tendency to impede technology 
differentiation from firms involved within the private-collective (medians: Q71-4=3). This 
phenomenon, which is inherent to any standardization process, whereby technological consensus is 
needed may force firms to compete just on price rather than on technological performance. 
Therefore private-collective institutions need to establish a delicate balance between two extremes: 
complete ex-ante specification versus dynamic ex-post consensus building. Remaining on the first 
extreme would lead to lower innovation rates and competition based on price whereas the second 
extreme would lead to competition based on features (and increased litigation which, if excessive, 
might become counter-productive to innovation). 
According to some of the experts interviewed, current regulation of the mobile industry can slow 
down the development of new technologies as, in contrast to the internet industry, mobile services 
are required to have extremely high levels of reliability. In this sense policy making could 
differentiate between critical technologies (e.g. radio access, antennae, basic communication 
services) and non-critical ones (e.g. mobile applications, multimedia services) in order to establish a 
tiered approach to mobile regulation.  
The analysis of 3GPP reveals that small technological firms are practically absent in the development 
of mobile standards with only 30 small firms (out of 200 in total, 3GPP 2013) and no essential 
patents to negotiate with (Table 1). Recent results find an increasing role played by small parties in 
the resulting ability to innovate (Von Hippel & von Krogh 2003; Lakhani & von Hippel 2003, Lakhani 
et al. 2013; Boudreau 2012), further research could investigate why other instances of private-
collective (e.g. software, internet, smartphone ecosystems) exhibit larger presence of small firms 
and if there exists any potential causality between the presence of small firms and the resulting 
innovation ability of the private-collective. 
Related theory on standards and technology development supports the importance of the 
essentiality concept as a key mechanism to facilitate technical interoperability (and resulting 
economies of scale and scope). The results of our research, however present a more nuanced 
relationship between essential patenting and the resulting ability of the focal firm to innovate and 
compete. In the case of 3GPP essential patenting adequately helps firms to develop new 
technologies (hypothesis H1.b,section 4.1.1) on the other hand this mechanism seems to constrain 
the ability to compete, especially at the collective level (hypothesis H2.b, section 4.2.1). 
The experience of 3GPP shows us that the manner in which IPrights policies are implemented in 
practice do have a profound effect on private-collective organizations. Contrary to FRAND licensing, 
which is completely specified and agreed prior to any technology commitment (i.e. standard 
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development), the attribution of essentiality remains open to ex-post interpretation. Interestingly 
3GPP does not mandate which patents become essential, as a result and according to a high level 
manager at 3GPP “almost every patent owner in 3GPP claim to have essential patents… the problem 
arises whenever a licensee does not agree on that essentiality status”. This would explain the 
increasing rates of litigation among firms in the mobile industry with prominent examples such as 
Samsung versus Ericsson (WSJ 2012; 2013), 3GPP participants, or Samsung versus Apple (Forbes 
2012).  
Litigation mechanisms, not necessarily indicative of a dysfunctional innovation regime, at present 
time are being over-abused specially by firms with no real involvement in technology development 
or commercialization. In this sense the 3GPP could, (1) adopt a more active role in the assertion of 
the essentiality aspect of patents in order to avoid ex-post interpretation by firms and (2) implement 
more efficient mechanisms to ensure transparency of patent ownership in the spirit of section 4 of 
the new innovation act (HR2013). 
We have revealed that a practical solution to the limitations of current essential patenting has been 
found and implemented in the context of 3GPP: it consists in associating essential patenting policies 
to an ex-ante maximum royalty rate policy, which limits ex-post opportunistic behavior. This 
practical solution raises some concerns however, given the possibility of maximum royalty rate to be 
interpreted as anti-competitive by current antitrust regulation, and its traditional condemnation on 
both sides of the Atlantic in standard-setting processes (Schmalensee 2009). 
We therefore raise the question of re-examining the potentially negative impact of antitrust 
regulation on collective innovation. The adoption of this practical solution, currently advocated by a 
number of firms involved in 3GPP (LTE 2008), would require modifications in antitrust regulation and 
a more flexible approach to public policing of collective innovation.  
While the paper does not propose a definitive answer to his question, it contributes to the 
innovation policy debate on the reform of the patent system and antitrust regulation (AMC 2007; 
Wright 2009; Zoettl et al. 2009) especially in the mobile sector (Balto 2004), by providing empirically-
based insights in favor of limiting the potentially negative impact of some aspects of competition 
policy on specific collective innovation challenges. This is a topical issue, as, in response to requests 
from relevant organizations (IEEE 2002) public bodies, especially in the USA, are starting to explore 
alternatives to conventional antitrust enforcement by suggesting among others an obligation on 
those firms submitting technologies to state the maximum royalty that will be sought in respect of 
any patents held (Barnett 2006, 2007; Masoudi 2007; Sidak 2008). In parallel, a number of firms in 
the mobile industry are leading initiatives aiming to supersede current limitations by explicitly 
suggesting maximum aggregate royalty levels for essential IPRs (e.g., single-digit percentage of sales 
price in the case of handsets and single-digit dollar amounts in the case of notebooks, LTE 2008).  
The analysis presented in this paper, indicating that 3GPP members considered maximum royalty 
rate policies as beneficial, supports a more relaxed public policy in regards to maximum royalty rate 
negotiations and supports Schmalensee (2009) who suggests that, provided certain safeguards 
relating to the extent to which private-collective members can actually discuss the licensing terms 
are in place, it should be acceptable for standards bodies to solicit provision of maximum royalty 
rates when a patented technology is submitted.  
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Avenues for future research include further empirical studies and the development of game-
theoretical models exploring the extent to which establishing predictable and more transparent 
maximum aggregate costs for licensing intellectual property rights might alleviate the problem of 
subjectivity in an ex-post interpretation of the essentiality concept either by firms (Wright 2009; 
Forbes 2012, 2013a, 2013b) or by governments overruling a court´s decision (FT 2013).  
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